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P E R S P E C T I V E
India and China:  
On a Collision Course?
Sumit Ganguly
Abstract
Sino-Indian relations, which have long been fraught, took an especially 
adverse turn this summer with a military-to-military confrontation on the 
Doklam Plateau near the India-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction. After several weeks, 
Indian and Chinese forces withdrew from the region. However, neither side 
resiled from their respective territorial claims. This episode exemplified 
the troubles that have come to characterize the Sino-Indian relationship, 
especially since Prime Minister Modi assumed office in 2014. His regime, 
which is more nationalistic and reposes greater faith in the utility of force 
in international politics, had initially sought to diplomatically court the 
PRC in the hopes of improving their bilateral relationship. However, these 
efforts did not prove successful. Instead, the People’s Liberation Army, as 
in the past, continued to undertake limited probes along the Himalayan 
border, while the PRC continued to make diplomatic, commercial, and 
strategic inroads into India’s neighbours, trying to reduce India’s influence 
in those countries. The Modi regime, in turn, sought to counter these 
initiatives through various efforts of its own in the neighbourhood. Beyond 
South Asia, India has also sought to enhance its ties with Australia, Japan, 
the United States, and Vietnam in an attempt to hedge against the PRC’s 
growing economic and military assertiveness in Asia. These endeavours, 
however, have elicited hostile reactions from Beijing, which sees New Delhi 
as the only significant potential hurdle to the expansion of its influence 
in Asia. Despite Beijing’s adverse reactions it is unlikely that the current 
regime in New Delhi will scale back its efforts to cope with what it deems to 
be significant threats emanating from its behemoth northern neighbour.
Keywords: Sino-Indian border dispute, quadrilateral, Doklam Plateau, 
limited probes, Bhutan
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2018912231
In the late summer of 2017, military units from the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) squared off on the Doklam Plateau at the Bhutan-Tibet-India trijunction. The crisis stemmed from 
the Chinese decision to construct a road on territory that Bhutan deemed 
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to be its own. India, which is treaty bound to Bhutan, chose to quickly move 
Indian Army units into the area to prevent any road construction activities.1
The military standoff occasioned much perfervid commentary from both 
sides.2 Lost in much of the discussion, however, was the larger strategic 
significance of the Chinese actions. The central argument of this essay is that 
the Chinese actions were actually emblematic of a larger strategy on the part 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to challenge India’s position in 
South Asia and to weaken its ties with its neighbours.3 Indeed it will be 
demonstrated that for the last decade or so the PRC has been steadily 
confronting India in South Asia and its immediate environs. 4
Owing to its size, its conventional military capabilities, its de facto nuclear 
weapons status and its record of economic growth since the early 1990s, India 
is the only Asian country that could potentially challenge the PRC’s goal of 
pursuing a position of strategic dominance in Asia. Furthermore, the two 
states, as some scholars have also noted, are engaged in a significant 
competition for critical resources, especially hydrocarbons, in areas adjacent 
to the Indian Ocean region and beyond.5
Faced with the increasing assertiveness of the PRC, India has tentatively 
reached out to the United States to balance its growing strength. Indeed the 
expansion of strategic ties with the United States has represented a significant 
shift in India’s foreign policy. The changes, in the view of more than one 
analyst, have been characterized as revolutionary.6 Even if one takes a more 
measured view, it is undeniable that the changes under the Narendra Modi 
regime have been more than merely cosmetic.7 In particular, India’s increased 
willingness to work with the United States has no doubt piqued Beijing.
Apart from the strategic partnership with the United States, Beijing has 
__________________
1  For a detailed discussion of the background to this complex territorial dispute see Ankit 
Panda, “The Political Geography of the India-China Crisis at Doklam,” The Diplomat, 13 July 2017, 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/the-political-geography-of-the-india-china-crisis-at-doklam/.
2  See for example Sutirtho Patranobis, “Unmistakable Message: Doklam Showed India Can 
Dig in Heels, Stand Up for Ally,” The Hindustan Times, 29 August 2017; You Dongxiao, “Why China 
Cannot Back Down in the Doklam,” ChinaDaily, 4 August 2017.
3  For a brief discussion see Sumit Ganguly, “The Doklam Dispute in Context,” ForeignAffairs.
com, 9 August 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2017-08-09/doklam-dispute-context.
4  For a discussion of recent Chinese initiatives in the subcontinent see Christian Wagner, “The 
Role of India and China in South Asia,” Strategic Analysis 40, no. 4 (2016): 307–320; for a broader 
discussion of the rivalry including its historical basis see Bertil Lintner, China’s India War: Collision 
Course on the Roof of the World (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018); for an alternative formulation 
of the sources of the border dispute and the onset of the 1962 war see M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, 
Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict In China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008).
5  “Sino-Indian power preponderance in maritime Asia: a (re-)source of conflict in the Indian 
Ocean and South China Sea,” Global Change, Peace and Security 25, no. 1 (2013): 5–26.
6  See for example C. Raja Mohan, Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence (New Delhi: 
HarperCollins, 2015).
7  Sumit Ganguly, “Has Modi Truly Changed India’s Foreign Policy?” The Washington Quarterly 
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also looked askance at India’s burgeoning relationship with Japan.8 In this 
context it is also reasonable to surmise that the PRC is likely to take further 
umbrage with the expanding security ties between India and Japan, as plans 
for the “quadrilateral” mechanism involving Australia, India, Japan, and the 
United States proceed apace.9 The stated goal of this forum is to promote 
consultation amongst the four states with a view toward maintaining freedom 
of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. However, there is no gainsaying that the 
four states have deemed this arrangement to be necessary because of the 
seemingly inexorable rise of the PRC and gnawing uncertainties on their 
part about its long-term goals in the region.10
These developments, in turn, have led the PRC to adopt a more aggressive 
stance toward India. Of course, the long unresolved border dispute between 
the two states has also enabled the PRC to periodically test India’s 
preparedness and resolve along the Himalayan border through a series of 
“limited probes.”11
This essay will focus on how the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
government sought to deal with the PRC and then delineate how Sino-Indian 
relations have evolved since Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) regime assumed office in April 2014. It will argue 
that after initial efforts to improve relations with the PRC and thereby to 
continue the policies of the previous regime, the new government felt 
compelled to adopt a more assertive stance toward India’s northern 
neighbour. Admittedly, there is little or no question that the Modi regime 
has a more assertive view of national security issues. This orientation in some 
measure explains its readiness to adopt a more forceful stance toward the 
PRC. The willingness of the Modi regime to pursue a firmer approach, it will 
be argued, has led the PRC to respond in an intransigent fashion.
From the UPA to the NDA
For the most part, with marked exceptions, the UPA regime during both its 
terms in office (2004–2009, 2009–2014) adopted a set of conciliatory policies 
toward the PRC. Early in his first term, in 2005, Chinese Prime Minister Wen 
__________________
8  Sutirtho Patranobis, “China has a message for India and Japan: Form partnership, not alliance,” 
The Hindustan Times, 14 September 2017; for some background to the evolution of the Indo-Japanese 
strategic partnership see David Brewster, “The India-Japan Security Relationship: An Enduring 
Partnership?” Asian Security 6, no. 2 (2010): 95–120.
9  Saibal Dasgupta, “China Hopes India-US-Australia-Japan Quadrilateral Won’t Damage ‘Third 
Party,’” The Times of India, 5 November 2017.
10  For a discussion of both shared and divergent concerns amongst the members see Ankit 
Panda, “U.S., Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working-Level Quadrilateral Meeting on regional 
Cooperation,” The Diplomat, 13 November 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india-
and-australia-hold-working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on-regional-cooperation/.
11  For a discussion of the concept of a “limited probe” see Alexander George and Richard 
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Jiabao visited India. The visit culminated in an agreement on trade and also 
on the resolution of the long-standing border dispute. Some Indian 
commentators also drew much comfort from the language of the joint 
communiqué. Indian interlocutors were pleased because it referred to 
Sikkim, an independent state which had been merged with India in 1975, 
as “the Sikkim State of the Republic of India.” That said, the PRC nevertheless 
did not formally state that Sikkim was an integral part of India. On the other 
hand, the joint communiqué made clear that Tibet was an autonomous 
region of China—a long-standing Chinese demand.12
Some improvements did take place the very next year in Sino-Indian 
relations. Specifically, the two sides agreed to re-open the Nathu La Pass, 
which had been closed since the 1962 Sino-Indian border war.13 This was a 
significant development and potentially an Indian concession because it 
would greatly facilitate the entry of Chinese goods into India. The cheapness 
of an array of Chinese consumer goods had made them quite attractive to 
Indian consumers.
Whatever goodwill that developed in Sino-Indian relations as a 
consequence of Wen Jiabao’s visit and the opening of the Nathu La Pass after 
a hiatus of forty-four years proved to be short-lived. In May of 2007, the PRC 
contended that an Indian Administrative Service officer from the 
northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh did not need a visa to visit 
the PRC on the grounds that he was from a region that belonged to the PRC. 
The officer was to visit the PRC as part of a delegation of Indian bureaucrats.14
Matters continued to worsen during the UPA regime. In 2009, for example, 
a series of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) incursions took place near the 
village of Demchok in Ladakh, in the northern region of the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir. In large measure, the PLA could undertake these probes 
because of better infrastructure on the Chinese side of the contested border. 
Faced with these repeated PLA intrusions, the UPA decided to improve road 
and other transport facilities on the Indian side.15 It is also worth noting that 
slightly later in the year India bolstered its military presence in the disputed 
state of Arunachal Pradesh in its northeast. Specifically, it decided to deploy 
a new 15,000-strong division and drew up plans to deploy a second division 
within the next couple of years. It also floated a tender to acquire 300 light 
tanks that could be used in either the terrain of the northeast or in Jammu 
and Kashmir.16
__________________
12  Brahma Chellaney, “Sikkim in India-China Relations,” The Hindustan Times, 6 June 2008.
13  Ambar Singh Roy, “Sikkim Traders Gung-Ho Over Opening of Nathula Pass,” The Hindu, 5 
July 2006.
14  For a discussion see David Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, “India and China: Conflict and 
Cooperation,” Survival 52, no. 1 (February-March 2010): 137–158.
15  Ben Arnoldy, “Growing number of China incursions into India lead to a strategy change,” 
The Christian Science Monitor, 9 September 2009.
16  Arun Joshi, “Indian Army to Deploy more troops along Arunachal border,” The Hindustan 
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The next year saw a renewal of Sino-Indian tensions owing to reports of the 
entry of PLA troops into a Pakistani-controlled Gilgit-Baltistan region of the 
disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Indian policy analysts and China 
specialists argued that the Chinese decision to deploy troops in this area 
stemmed from its ongoing efforts to extend the Karakorum Highway all the 
way to the port of Gwadar in Baluchistan.17 Bilateral relations continued to 
deteriorate for the rest of the UPA’s years in power as Beijing chose to up the 
ante on a variety of other issues. For example, in January 2012, it refused to 
grant a visa to a senior Indian Air Force officer hailing from the northeast. 
Though no reason was given, Indian interlocutors assumed that the decision 
was a signal that the PRC was disputing India’s claim to wide swathes of territory 
in its northeastern region. Despite these irritants, as part of its ongoing 
negotiations with the PRC, India signed a border agreement in the same month. 
This accord was designed to facilitate real-time contact between the foreign 
offices of the two countries in the event of an incident along the border. 18
Earlier, in 2010, China had denied a visa to General B. S. Jaswal, the 
Northern Army commander responsible for the security of Jammu and 
Kashmir. This decision had led the Indian government to suspend all bilateral 
defence exchanges.19 As the regime in New Delhi appeared to stiffen its 
resolve the PLA continued to probe and prod Indian forces along various 
parts of the Himalayan border.
In a move probably designed to test the preparedness and alertness of 
beefed-up Indian forces along the border, in May of 2013 contingents of the 
PLA crossed over into areas near Daulet Beg Oldi in Ladakh that India 
deemed to be within its territory. This probe was significant as it took place 
near the Karakorum Highway that the PRC had constructed through territory 
that Pakistan had ceded to it in 1963. The highway had enabled the PRC to 
link Tibet with the province of Xinjiang.20 Only when confronted with Indian 
forces did the PLA end this standoff. Curiously enough, this incident 
occurred barely a month or so prior to the impending visit of the new Chinese 
Prime Minister Li Kequiang to New Delhi. Some Indian analysts argued that 
this incident had a larger significance beyond testing India’s resolve along 
the border. In their view, it was designed to send a message that Beijing was 
unhappy about India’s growing overtures toward other states, most notably 
Vietnam, with whom the PRC had long had strained relations.21
__________________
17  Press Trust of India (PTI), “China’s Presence in Gilgit-Baltistan: NYT,” The Hindu, 29 August 
2010
18  For the text of the agreement see: http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/17963/
19  PTI, “China denies visa to IAF officer: Indian puts visit on hold,” India Today, 6 January 2012; 
also see TNN, “China at it again, denies visa to Arunachal officer,” The Times of India, 7 January 2012.
20  PTI, Chinese PLA make incursion bids in Ladakh,” The Indian Express, 5 April 2015.
21  Freya Petersen and Jason Overdorf, “China and India Withdraw Troops From Daulet Beg 
Oldie, Ending Standoff,” Global Post, 6 May 2013, https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-05-06/china-and-
india-withdraw-troops-daulat-beg-oldie-ladakh-ending-standoff; also see Heather Timmons, “Chinese 
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Despite these various setbacks, the UPA regime persisted in its efforts to 
maintain and foster a working relationship with the PRC. To that end, Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh visited Beijing in October 2013. This visit was of 
considerable significance. In Beijing, Manmohan Singh presided over the 
signing of a major accord, the Border Defence and Cooperation Agreement 
(BDCA) designed to avoid conflict along the disputed border. Among other 
matters, the two sides reiterated that they would not use their military forces 
along the Line of Control (the de facto border) for offensive purposes, that 
they would avoid provocative actions, and they would exercise mutual self-
restraint and would not harass each other’s military patrols in border areas. 
In effect, this agreement was a significant confidence-building measure 
(CBM) built upon prior accords.22 Though this measure was no doubt 
important, other extant Indian concerns remained unaddressed. For 
example, the Indian delegation made no headway on the issue of stapled 
visas for Indian nationals from its northeast travelling to the PRC.23
The tactical dimensions of this agreement became quickly apparent, as 
the border dispute, clearly, was no closer to a resolution in the wake of this 
crisis. Weeks after Singh’s visit to Beijing the PRC referred to the state of 
Arunachal Pradesh in India’s northeast as “South Tibet.” The angry reaction 
from the PRC probably stemmed from the visit of India’s president, Pranab 
Mukherjee, who had referred to the state as an “integral and important part 
of India.”24 Matters did not substantially improve during the remainder of 
the UPA regime. For example, in March 2014 a series of fresh PLA incursions 
took place in Ladakh. Only when Indian forces steadfastly stood their ground 
did the PLA units back off.25
The Sino-Indian Relationship Under Prime Minister Modi
Amongst India’s attentive public it was widely expected that there would be 
a more robust response to Chinese provocations when Prime Minister Modi 
assumed office in 2014. Modi, a member of the right-of-centre Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP), made clear during the election campaign that he intended 
to adopt a tougher stance toward India’s long-standing adversary, Pakistan. 
During an election rally earlier in the year, he also warned the PRC to 
abandon its “expansionist mindset.” Obviously piqued by his public 
statement, the PRC hit back, saying it had “never waged a war of aggression 
__________________
22  For a skeptical account of this agreement see Monika Chansoria, “India-China Border 
Agreement: Much Ado about Nothing,” Foreign Policy.com, 13 January 2013, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2014/01/13/india-china-border-agreement-much-ado-about-nothing.
23  PTI, “India, China sign border agreement; no breakthrough over stapled visa issue,” Daily 
News and Analysis, 23 October 2013.
24  Aakriti Bachhawat, “China’s Arunachal Pradesh Fixation,” The Diplomat, 16 December 2013, 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-arunachal-pradesh-fixation/.
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to occupy any inch of land of other countries.” 26 Consequently, some within 
those circles, who had feared Modi would adopt a needlessly provocative 
posture toward the PRC, were no doubt pleasantly surprised when shortly 
after assuming office, he invited his counterpart, Xi Jinping, to India for a 
state visit. 27 To that end, in June 2014, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi visited New Delhi and held discussions with his counterpart, Sushma 
Swaraj, to lay the groundwork for Xi’s impending visit.
On the eve of Xi’s visit, two border incidents cast a long shadow. The first 
was a border clash that took place in Ladakh. On this occasion, the apparent 
precipitant was an Indian effort to build a canal along the undemarcated 
border near the village of Demchok. As the effort was under way, initially 
Chinese civilians mounted a protest. Soon thereafter units of the PLA quickly 
entered the fray. Faced with the PLA’s involvement India moved to bolster 
its troop presence in the region, leading to a three-week standoff.
This would not be the only incident that would raise questions about the 
future of the Sino-Indian relationship. Even as New Delhi prepared to greet 
Xi with considerable fanfare, including plans to host him in Modi’s home 
state of Gujarat, yet another incident marred Sino-Indian relations. 28 This 
encounter also took place in Ladakh, in the Chumar sector in the eastern 
part of this region, precipitated by a Chinese effort to level a rivulet and 
construct a road within what India deemed to be its territory. Indian forces, 
who had dealt with similar incursions, responded with alacrity and destroyed 
the Chinese-built track.29 Various flag meetings between local commanders 
proved necessary before this standoff could be defused.30 It is intriguing to 
note that these incidents took place even as the two leaders moved to 
substantially deepen bilateral economic ties. Xi and Modi, among other 
matters, signed a dozen pacts, discussed the expansion of cultural exchanges, 
education, and tourism, with the PRC promising to invest as much as US$20 
billion.31
It is important to underscore that unlike in the past, when previous regimes 
had sought to paper over or downplay Sino-Indian confrontations along the 
border, Modi categorically emphasized to his Chinese guest that these 
__________________
26  PTI, “Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi holds talks with Sushma Swaraj,” The Times of India, 
8 June 2014.
27  Sutirtho Patranobis, “China’s President Xi Jinping’s visit to India, focus on first lady,” The 
Hindustan Times, 9 September 2014.
28  Jason Burke and Tania Branigan, “India-China border standoff highlights tensions before Xi 
visit,” The Guardian, 16 September 2014.
29  Shishir Gupta, “China, India in border Skirmish ahead of Xi’s visit,” The Hindustan Times, 16 
September 2014.
30  DNA Web Team, “Chinese army makes fresh incursion into Ladakh: PM Narendra Modi likely 
to raise issue with President Xi Jinping,” Daily News and Analysis, 18 September 2014.
31  Rishi Iyengar, “A Border Standoff and Free Tibet Protests Mar Xi Jinping’s Arrival in Delhi,” 
Time, 18 September 2014; also see Victor Mallet, “China-India stand-off overshadows Xi Jinping’s 
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incidents were a significant issue. He made India’s discomfiture clear when 
he told his guest that “a little toothache can paralyze the entire body.”32 The 
visit and the incidents in Ladakh underscored a fundamental tension in the 
bilateral relationship. The PRC obviously was keen on expanding the scope 
of the economic relationship with India. However, it had little or no interest 
in moving with any dispatch in terms of addressing the vexed issue of the 
border dispute. 33
Might the incursions have taken place without Xi’s explicit knowledge 
and sanction? Some have suggested that the incursions were the result of 
internal political machinations within the PRC.34 This argument, though 
seemingly plausible, seems rather unlikely. Xi, according to most accounts, 
has significantly consolidated his power within the Chinese political order.35 
According to a highly regarded, senior Indian official with extensive 
experience dealing with the PRC, the conventional “bureaucratic politics” 
argument that suggests the possible competition amongst organizations to 
further their own parochial interests at particular junctures simply does not 
apply to Xi’s PRC.36
Despite these untoward and troubling incidents, Modi continued to press 
ahead in his efforts to engage the PRC. In fact, he even dispatched Swaraj, 
the minister for External Affairs, to Beijing to explore opportunities for some 
headway on the seemingly irresolvable border dispute. 37
Following her trip to the PRC in February, Modi himself travelled to China 
in mid-May 2015. About a month prior to Modi’s visit the PRC announced 
its “one belt, one road” initiative. Shortly thereafter, India sharply protested 
this project as it would involve the construction of a road through disputed 
territory in Jammu and Kashmir.38 In fact, it needs to be underscored that 
Indian policy makers continue to highlight their staunch opposition to this 
endeavour.39
The visit, like that of Xi to New Delhi, involved considerable fanfare. 
__________________
32  TNN, “Chinese incursion in Ladakh: A little toothache can paralyze entire body, Modi tells 
Xi Jinping,” The Times of India, 20 September 2014.
33  Jeff M. Smith, Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2015).
34  See for example Eric Meyer, “Who Sabotaged Chinese President Xi Jinping’s India Visit,” 
Forbes.com, 23 September 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericrmeyer/2014/09/23/who-
sabotaged-xi-jinpings-india-visit/#2484039070fa.
35  Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping Assuming New Status as China’s “Core” Leader,” The New York 
Times, 4 February 2016.
36  Personal interview conducted with senior, retired Indian official, New Delhi, September 2015.
37  Shannon Tiezzi, “China and India Want a Breakthrough on Their Border Dispute,” The 
Diplomat, 5 February 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-and-india-want-a-breakthrough-
on-their-border-dispute/.
38  Rezaul H. Laskar, “India, Pakistan Spar Over Economic Corridor Passing Through PoK,” The 
Hindustan Times, 1 June 2015.
39  Indrani Bagchi, “India slams China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative says it violates sovereignty,” 




























































India and China: At Odds Again
Among other matters, Modi visited the city of Xi’an, Xi’s birthplace, where 
the bilateral talks were held. It is interesting to note that while Modi stressed 
the importance of settling the extant border dispute and the PRC’s plans to 
pursue the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, which among other matters 
involved the construction of a major highway through disputed territory, the 
PRC instead focused on the possibilities of increased Chinese investment in 
India.40 In the event, most of the focus remained on commercial ties and 
investments. A number of powerful Indian conglomerates signed agreements 
amounting to US$22 billion in trade and investment prospects with their 
Chinese counterparts during this visit.41
Recent Developments
Despite these striking developments in the commercial arena, they simply 
did not translate into any gains in other relations. Since the conclusion of 
the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement, one that the PRC had 
vehemently opposed, India had been seeking membership in the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG), a body that regulates international commerce in 
nuclear materials. Despite American support some other states had expressed 
tepid opposition to India’s entry into this organization given its unwillingness 
to eschew its nuclear weapons program and its staunch opposition to the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The most significant stumbling 
block to India’s inclusion in this body, however, remained the PRC.
In June 2016, with an impending meeting of the forty-eight-member group 
in Vienna, Indian officials made a concerted effort to persuade them to grant 
India membership.42 The PRC, however, proved to be utterly intransigent 
and dismissed India’s request on the grounds that it was not an NPT-compliant 
state.43 A renewed attempt, in 2017, to make some headway proved to be 
equally futile. Once again, it was the PRC that remained the principal 
impediment to India’s ambitions.44
__________________
40  Narendra Modi Starts Trip to China With a Burst of Sightseeing,” The New York Times, 15 May 
2015.
41  Saibal Dasgupta, “Deals worth $22 billion signed during Narendra Modi’s China visit,” The 
Times of India, 17 May 2015.
42  Apparently, Indian diplomacy prior to this meeting was less than adroit. According to a key 
US Department of Defense official who had been involved in these discussions, Indian counterparts 
had adopted a rather unyielding position. They had, according to him, failed to offer any meaningful 
concessions which could have elicited more robust support from the United States and its allies, 
thereby helping to overcome the staunch opposition of the PRC. Based upon personal communication 
with former US official, September 2017.
43  Elizabeth Roche, “Key NSG meeting today: China holds out despite high-level India plea,” 
liveMint, 10 June 2016. http://www.livemint.com/Politics/0OOYqyQEJBeRKsJT2bS7oL/China-
remains-main-hurdle-to-India-joining-Nuclear-Suppliers.html.
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Even after Modi’s seemingly successful visit to the PRC, certain other 
developments made clear that China remained fundamentally at odds with 
India on issues that had little to do with the long-standing border dispute. 
India, for years, had been imploring the United Nations to place certain 
Pakistan-based terrorist organizations on its list of global terrorist 
organizations. However, the PRC yet again instituted what was termed as a 
“technical hold” on placing Syed Salahuddin, the leader of the Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen (HuM), a Kashmiri terrorist organization with ties to Pakistan’s 
security establishment, on the terrorist list. This was obviously not an isolated 
event: in the past the PRC had refused to place Hafeez Mohammed Saeed, 
the head of the Pakistan-based, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), on the list, based on 
the grounds that it needed more information on the organization’s links 
with Al Qaeda.45
Similarly, later in October 2016, the PRC again came to the assistance of 
its ally Pakistan by placing a “technical hold” on listing Maulana Masood 
Azhar, the leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) a terrorist group based 
in Pakistan, which had been implicated in a series of major terrorist attacks 
on Indian soil, including one against the Indian parliament in December 
2001. Earlier in the year, the PRC had already blocked an Indian attempt to 
place a ban on the JeM leader following a terror attack on an Indian Air 
Force base in Pathankot in which his organization had been implicated. At 
this time, the PRC was the only member of a fifteen-country committee of 
the UN Sanctions Committee that had voted against India. The others had 
agreed to sanctions that would have put in place an assets freeze and a travel 
ban.46
This diplomatic setback, however, did not lead to a complete impasse in 
relations. India continued the protracted negotiations with the PRC on the 
border issue. To that end it went ahead with the nineteenth round of talks 
on the subject. Accordingly, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who 
was also the designated special representative for these negotiations, agreed 
to meet with his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi.47
The PRC’s stated reasons for its inability and unwillingness to help 
proscribe these organizations and their leaders under the aegis of the United 
Nations were, bluntly stated, disingenuous. The underlying reason had to 
do with China’s extensive ties to Pakistan: the government saw little or no 
reason to sanction a vital ally in the subcontinent, which was for all practical 
__________________
45  PTI, “China mum on delaying India’s call for UN ban on Pak militants,” The Hindu, 1 June 
2015.
46  K. J. M. Varma, “China continues to block India’s bid for Masood Azhar’s UN terror listing,” 
livemint, 1 October 2016. http://www.livemint.com/Politics/StSJk5yzKx9BlNrrSOBnHO/China-
continues-to-block-Indias-bid-for-Masood-Azhars-UN-t.html.
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purposes a strategic surrogate in the region.48 Evidence of the PRC’s virtually 
unstinted support for Pakistan mounted in 2016. In March of that year news 
reports emerged in the Indian media that the Indian Army had detected the 
presence of PLA troops at forward posts along the Line of Control in Kashmir. 
According to intercepted communications, the PLA forces were in particular 
locations to help in the development of infrastructure in areas under 
Pakistan’s control. Earlier in 2015, PLA troops had been detected in the 
Tangdhar region, the site of a major hydroelectric power plant that a Chinese 
company was constructing for Pakistan. 49
Over the past couple of years, despite the burgeoning trade and investment 
relationship with the PRC, problems continued to dog the overall tenor of 
the relationship. Indeed, contrary to those who believe that trade and 
investment can help dilute intractable disputes, the evidence from the Sino-
Indian relationship clearly suggests otherwise. Despite a substantial expansion 
of bilateral economic relations, there is no evidence that supports the 
proposition that it can ameliorate the contentious features of the relationship. 
Worse still, the economic relationship largely remains tilted in China’s favour. 
India faces a significant trade deficit with no prospect of any improvement 
in the foreseeable future.50 This factor may become more significant in the 
future as the Modi regime faces demands from domestic manufacturers who 
have been adversely affected as a consequence of a flood of cheap Chinese 
products. Furthermore, given the existence of a streak of economic 
nationalism within the ranks of the BJP itself, these pressures could prove 
to be more compelling.
The latest standoff at Doklam is a stark reminder that the PRC remains 
intent on bolstering its military capabilities near and along the disputed 
border. The initial efforts of the Modi regime to court the PRC obviously 
counted for little in Beijing. In the wake of the standoff it is hard to envisage 
how the strategic rivalry can possibly be contained, given that it has steadily 
worsened, mostly because of Beijing’s intransigence.
The Relationship in a Global Context
The foregoing analysis has shown that the PRC remains intransigent on the 
border issue, it continues to support Pakistan at various bilateral and 
multilateral forums, and it is unwilling to support India in various global 
regimes such as in the arenas of nonproliferation or counterterrorism. In 
__________________
48  For a discussion of this nexus see Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis (London: C. Hurst 
and Company, 2015).
49  PTI, “Chinese Army troops spotted along LOC in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,” The Hindustan 
Times, 13 March 2016.
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considerable part, the problems in the Sino-Indian relationship must be 
placed in a wider historical and global context.
The origins of the Sino-Indian border dispute are quite complex and have 
been examined in considerable detail elsewhere.51 However, once the rivalry 
ensued, the PRC was relentless in its opposition to India. At a bilateral level, 
the PRC has posed a significant security threat to India since the disastrous 
Sino-Indian border war of 1962.52 This is not only because of its substantial 
nuclear and conventional capabilities in general but also, as has been carefully 
outlined here, because of its willingness to periodically test India’s alertness 
and preparedness along the disputed border. Simultaneously, as the desultory 
border talks have demonstrated, it appears to be in no particular hurry to 
resolve the border dispute.
The threat from the PRC is not merely bilateral but regional. It has long 
bolstered the military capabilities of Pakistan, one of India’s key adversaries. 
To that end it has assisted Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, enhanced 
its conventional capabilities and has, as demonstrated here, routinely shielded 
Pakistan from global censure despite the latter’s obvious involvement with 
terror directed at India.53
Beyond Pakistan, the PRC has also sought to expand its strategic influence 
in South Asia. To that end it has attempted to make inroads into Bangladesh, 
Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Though Bangladesh faces no extant, sea-borne threat 
to its shipping, the PRC sold the country two submarines—much to New 
Delhi’s consternation.54 It has also sought to establish a strategic foothold in 
Sri Lanka. To that end it has agreed to purchase the port of Hambantota.55 
The acquisition of the port aside, in 2017 India also had reason to be 
concerned after the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines 
docked in Sri Lanka. Only after vigorous Indian protests did the Sri Lankans 
rebuff further PLAN requests for port calls.56
__________________
51  See for example Berenice Guyot-Rechard, Shadow States: India, China and the Himalayas, 
1910–1962 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
52  One of the best treatments remains John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in 
the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015); also see Manjeet S. Pardesi, 
“Instability in Tibet and the Sino-Indian Strategic Rivalry: Do Domestic Politics Matter?” in Asian 
Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation and Limitations on Two-Level Games, eds. Sumit Ganguly and William R. 
Thompson (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011).
53  On Pakistan’s involvement with terror see S. Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist 
Militancy, National Security and the Pakistani State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
54  PTI, “Bangla PM Sheikh Hasina defends Decision to Buy Two Chinese Submarines,” The 
Economic Times, 13 July 2017.
55  Narayani Basu, “China Buys Hambantota Port: Should India Be Concerned?” The Diplomat, 
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These efforts to woo Sri Lanka, of course, are quite apart from the PRC’s 
long-term efforts to try and undermine India’s position in the Himalayan 
state of Nepal. These efforts have proven quite successful. Among other 
matters, the PRC replaced India as the principal investor in Nepal in 2014. 
In 2017, it provided as much as US$8.3 billion in grants, interest-free loans, 
and loans on concessional terms. 57
Beyond the immediate reaches of South Asia, the PRC has also sought to 
hobble India from pursuing legitimate economic interests in Southeast Asia. 
To that end it has vehemently objected to India drilling for oil and natural 
gas off the coast of Vietnam. Given India’s acute needs for energy, it has 
refused to cave into the demands of the PRC.58
China’s bellicose reaction toward India’s engagement with Vietnam may 
have backfired. India and Vietnam, which have long had a cordial relationship 
harking back to the era of Nehru and Ho Chi Minh, have been bolstering 
their security partnership since 2007, when a formal agreement on defence 
cooperation was signed. A shared concern over China’s aggressiveness, no 
doubt, is leading to a tightening of the Indo-Vietnamese strategic partnership. 
Earlier this year, India agreed to sell Vietnam the indigenously designed 
Akash missile. It is also considering the sale of an Indo-Russian missile, the 
BrahMos, and is in the midst of training Vietnamese personnel to operate 
Russian Kilo-class submarines and Sukhoi-30 jets.59
Finally, and especially as India has entered the global arena, the PRC has 
made every effort to constrain its rise. Despite its own abysmal record on 
nonproliferation it has sought to depict India as a less than responsible 
nuclear power.60 This has been more than evident as India has sought to 
establish itself not only as a de facto nuclear weapons state but also to enter 
a vital global regulatory regime, the NSG.
Despite India’s diplomatic efforts to court the PRC, its efforts to avoid 
provocative actions along the disputed border and to expand economic ties, 
it is more than evident that the PRC will continue to pique and trouble India 
at every available opportunity. It sees India as the only power in Asia that 
stands in the way of its quest for dominance in the continent and beyond. 
Consequently, as India seeks to build its ties with other Asian powers, 
especially Australia, Japan, and Vietnam, the PRC will invariably attempt to 
create diplomatic and strategic problems for India. Above all, the PRC has 
__________________
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Market,” The Hindustan Times, 19 October 2017.
58  David Scott, “India’s Role in the South China Sea: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in Play,” 
The India Review 12, no. 2 (May 2013): 51–69.
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South China Morning Post, 13 January 2017.
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been, and will become even more assertive if not outright aggressive, as India 
seeks to bolster its strategic relationship with the United States.
The recent difficulties that have dogged the Sino-Indian relationship, 
most assuredly, do not primarily stem from the nationalistic features of the 
Modi regime. The regime’s more forthright policies may have evoked a 
vigorous set of responses from the PRC. However, they can mostly be traced 
to a set of patterns and practices on the part of the PRC, designed to hem 
India within the confines of the subcontinent. Attempts on India’s part to 
pursue a more conciliatory approach toward the PRC are unlikely to elicit 
more cooperative behaviour. Instead, a policy of firmness and resolve in its 
dealings with the PRC may at least help protect India’s vital security interests.
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